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CITY BOUND: How STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION. By Gerald E. Frug
and David J. Barron. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 2008.
Pp. xvii, 260. $35.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine how stunted our understanding of the federal government
would be without any detailed scholarly examination of the U.S. Constitu-
tion itself. As remarkable as that sounds, that is essentially the problem that
Gerald Frug' and David Barron' have set out to remedy for local govern-
ments in their superb City Bound. In the book, Frug and Barron take a
comprehensive, empirical look at the legal frameworks under which cities
and other local governments operate, providing an invaluable roadmap for
understanding the hidden architecture of legal constraints that-largely
without notice-are shaping America's urban future.
Why this kind of analysis has rarely been attempted may have some-
thing to do with the fact that there are nearly twenty thousand municipalities
and nearly ninety thousand local governments all told in the United States
today.3 It likely has even more to do with the fact that, by comparison to the
federal or state constitutions, divining the precise nature of local legal power
is not as simple as reviewing a municipal charter. As Frug and Barron note,
the precise contours of what they call "city structures" must be culled from a
detailed examination of the bewildering "mix of grants of, and restrictions
on, local power" (p. 3) through which states shape the authority of their lo-
calities.
Frug and Barron tackle this daunting task through a comparative analy-
sis of the legal structures that bind seven large, relatively successful central
cities. In their study, Frug and Barron examine not only the contours of
home rule-the default scope of local authority to act and resist state pre-
emption-but also plumb the particular empowerment and disempowerment
of those seven cities in matters of revenue and expenditure, land use and
development, and education policy.
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. The author wishes to thank
Clare Huntington, Ngai Pindell, and Laurie Reynolds for helpful comments.
1. Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
2. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
3. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2007 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS tbl. 3 (2007), http:/
www.census.gov/govs/cog/GovOrgTabO3ss.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2009) (reporting 19,492 mu-
nicipalities and 89,476 total local governments, a category that also includes counties, special
districts, school districts, and other nonmunicipal entities).
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Frug and Barron's foray into the mottled reality of contemporary home
rule serves as a springboard for their larger ambition of reforming the over-
sight of local authority. They acknowledge, and do not shy away from, the
reality that states will always play a central role in structuring the terms of
local power. They argue nonetheless that states can be much more thought-
ful and deliberate in how they create and manage these structures to
empower local governments to address urban issues, particularly on a coop-
erative and regional basis. To frame this advocacy, Frug and Barron outline
a series of what they call "city futures"-possible paths of development and
identity toward which cities might strive-and convincingly argue that cities
face an odd array of state-created enticements and barriers in trying to chart
their own democratically accountable destinies.
Frug and Barron's analysis of the unfortunate incentive effects that city
structures place on potential urban futures is persuasive. As compelling as
their portrait of home rule is, however, it paints an image of local govern-
ments that might be overly static in terms of the reaction those governments
have to the incentives they face. Frug and Barron hint at the practical chal-
lenges to change that the political economy of state oversight poses, and
suggest that local governments-even the thriving central cities they high-
light--often acquiesce to that oversight as a practical matter. Although it is
no doubt true in many instances that local governments react to the legal-
structural constraints they face in an inert, rather than dynamic, fashion,
emphasizing those constraints risks obscuring the many ways in which local
governments struggle to change and transcend the legal playing field on
which they operate.
Accordingly, this Review, after describing Frug and Barron's central
claims, seeks to add a layer to their conception of local authority by explor-
ing ways in which local governments engage as active agents within the
framework of that authority. Many local governments-from Frug and Bar-
ron's big cities to far-flung micropolitan rural towns-work to change the
state laws that bind them, forge partnerships with other public and private
sources of authority, apply traditional legal tools in novel ways when barred
from responding to problems more directly, and undertake similar activities
that represent a collective refusal to take the scope of their legal authority as
a given.
This kind of agentic, entrepreneurial approach to legal authority is un-
likely to fundamentally solve the very real structural problems facing local
governments that Frug and Barron so ably highlight. It does suggest, how-
ever, that some city officials have managed to take pragmatic steps to
recalibrate their own power. Encouraging these kinds of leaps by cities and
other local governments may be a more promising avenue of reform than
hoping for change from the very states that have, intentionally or uninten-
tionally, so often bound their localities.
[Vol. 108:957
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I. A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF LOCAL AUTHORITY
In City Bound and the previous work on which it builds,4 Frug and Bar-
ron aim to move conceptions of local power away from a stale dichotomy
between plenary state authority over their so-called "creatures" (surely not
the most flattering way to describe any entity) and the equally unrealistic
image of absolute local autonomy.' As they argue throughout, local power
must be understood not as a monolithic grant of authority or as a blanket
denial of local autonomy by the state. Rather, current legal structures un-
evenly supply and withhold power in a variety of important areas. This legal
landscape has the "key feature" of "direct[ing] the substantive ways in
which local power is exercised through the complex mix of grants and limits
that it establishes" (p. 35).
To bolster this argument, Frug and Barron tapped a group of leading lo-
cal-government scholars to help them produce detailed comparative
examinations of the city structures of Boston, Seattle, New York, Atlanta,
San Francisco, Denver, and Chicago.6 In area after area of substantive au-
thority, Frug and Barron unpack the range of alternating empowerment and
disempowerment under which these cities operate. Beginning with home
rule, they show how pervasive is the structuring and interference that flows
from the state level: the city charters of several of their case-study cities
were drafted by state legislatures (p. 64); seemingly sweeping grants of
home rule-statutory or constitutional-both give and take power (and
leave to the courts the task of confronting almost metaphysical questions of
the line between "local" and "state" interest) (pp. 66-69); and, depending on
the issue and the state, an almost random pattern of state preemption of local
law and conversely local preemption of state law prevails (p. 72).
Likewise in the area of revenue and expenditures, Frug and Barron ex-
amine the ubiquitous control that states exert over local fiscal decisions.
State law allows and disallows various tax options (pp. 76-87); determines
which fees may be assessed and how (pp. 87-90); grants aid generally with
strings attached (pp. 90-92); and oddly intrudes into a variety of expendi-
ture decisions (pp. 92-95). The same general pattern holds true in the
4. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2003);
Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763 (2002).
5. Frug and Barron focus their analysis on large, relatively successful central cities. This
provides a slightly skewed view of some aspects of local governance-most local governments, for
example, do not play the outsized political role in their states that Boston, Atlanta, Chicago and
other dominant cities play in Massachusetts, Georgia, and Illinois-but in the main their analysis
has salience for the range of generalist, elected local governments.
6. For research on Seattle, New York, Atlanta, San Francisco, Denver, and Chicago, Frug
and Bar-on commissioned reports, respectively, from Keith Aoki of the University of California-
Davis, Richard Briffault of Columbia Law School, William Buzbee of Emory Law School, Richard
Ford of Stanford Law School, Richard Schragger of Virginia Law School, and Laurie Reynolds of
the University of Illinois College of Law. P. xvi. Frug and Barron had also collaborated, with Rick
Su, on a report about home rule in Boston that served as a precursor to the comparative analysis in
City Bound. See DAVID J. BARRON ET AL., DISPELLING THE MYTH OF HOME RULE (Rappaport Inst.




exercise of the quintessential local power to regulate land use and develop-
ment. Here, again, cities are both empowered and disempowered in ways
that create incentives for acting that local communities might not otherwise
choose (pp. 99-120). And, finally, state law sets the terms of much of the
actual decision making of local school districts, constraining local choice
even when not directly supplanting it (pp. 121-40).
In all of these areas, and others,7 Frug and Barron rightly argue that
states structure local power not only directly, but through a myriad of indi-
rect institutions and policy choices. Thus, for example, the fact that
Massachusetts and entities under its purview control Logan Airport, the To-
bin Memorial Bridge, the tunnels that connect the city to its east end, and
much other important property creates a gaping hole in Boston's land-use
authority (pp. 105-07). Similarly, the way that Massachusetts fosters charter
schools, sets local school district boundaries, and empowers suburbs to veto
interdistrict options creates a set of structures and relationships that signifi-
cantly affects the ability of the Boston public schools to achieve their goals
(pp. 128-34). These indirect state-level choices, as with direct mixing of
powers and disabilities, warp the decisions that local governments can
make.'
In the broad sweep of their argument, Frug and Barron's primary norma-
tive concern is the problem of democratic deficits that arise from state
intervention, with decisions made or controlled at the state level undermin-
ing participation and accountability. Frug and Barron do not seem
instrumental about this in the main-they are not arguing that local govern-
ments will necessarily make better decisions than their state counterparts.
Rather, they argue that cities should be allowed to try in a classic experi-
mentalist mode, possibly fail, learn from the experience, and develop the
confidence to chart their own destiny.9
7. As Frug and Barron note, they could have developed similar analyses for many other
areas of local power, including "transportation, public safety, and public health." P. 54.
8. One gap in City Bound's descriptive claims is any significant discussion of the federal
role both in constraining state authority and in constraining and at times empowering local govern-
ments. The federal government, however, does play a role at the local level, at times mandating or
encouraging regional cooperation (as with regional air-quality-management districts, see, e.g., Revi-
sions to the California State Implementation Plan, South Coast Air Quality Management District, 73
Fed. Reg. 76,947, 76,948 (Dec. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.FR. pt. 52); or metropolitan plan-
ning organizations connected to the dispersal of federal transportation funds, see, e.g., Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, 23 U.S.C. § 134
(2006) (outlining Metropolitan Planning Organizations' responsibilities in connection with the re-
ceipt of federal funds)), and at times acting as an intervening source of authority between states and
local governments. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Col-
laboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REv. 959 (2007). I will return to this point in
Part I, below, but for now it is simply worth noting that the argument Frug and Barron make about
the state role in local governments can be made-albeit with less pervasive effect-about the federal
role at the state and local level.
9. Frug and Barron's picture of the inconsistently constrained nature of local government
could, in some ways, apply to every other level of government. The federal government has (theo-
retically) limited and enumerated powers, is constrained (perhaps at the margins) by the separation
of powers and by reservations of power to the states (and to the people), and must not contravene the
individual rights provisions of the federal constitution. A similar set of bounds constrains state gov-
[Vol. 108:957
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City Bound's theoretical construct and empirical investigation allow
Frug and Barron to insert themselves into major debates in urban theory and
also to outline a reform agenda. On the former, they show that argument
after argument among theorists about the nature of cities proceeds without a
clear sense of, or even much engagement with, the ways in which states
structure local authority. Urban theorists have long debated, for example,
whether local politics is dominated by elites or pluralist interest-group jock-
eying;'o whether cities have the ability to transcend the external limitations
they face;" and how to shift toward a paradigm of local governance that
privileges coalition building to achieve pragmatic goals." In each of these
debates, Frug and Barron argue, there is an important misunderstanding of
the nature of legal constraints that shape local governments and the prescrip-
tions that flow from various advocates are destined to fail without a sense of
the state-generated legal filters through which they must pass. Frug and Bar-
ron are careful not to overstate their claim, 3 but note that any substantive
urban agenda must take cognizance of the structure of local-government law
itself. 
14
In terms of a reform agenda moving forward, Frug and Barron return to
the broader urban discourse to show how state-generated legal structures
constrain cities' ability to choose among possible urban futures. Say local
officials, for example, decide to try to become a "global city"-an amor-
phous concept, but one that generally emphasizes a city's role as an
international financial capital or immigration destination. Those officials
would likely have a number of tools at their disposal, validated by state law,
to attract global financial and related service industries. These tools might
include land-use policies that favor high-end office construction and relative
freedom to provide incentives to companies to relocate-tools that might
not be available to pursue other urban futures. Conversely, those officials
would be constrained by the fragmentation of local governments (any ex-
penditures, for example, on attracting foreign investment could easily go to
a central city's free-riding suburban neighbors), limited control over regional
emments, buffeted between federal preemption and, in some states, constitutional home-rule pre-
emption by local governments. In practice, the federal government and the states may have
relatively broad powers compared to the cities on which Frug and Barron focus. But that said, Frug
and Barron's point is a powerful one: for every public entity, and particularly for local governments,
there is no such thing as pure autonomy or pure control.
10. The community power debate pitted theorists who focused on the power of elites to
control city policies against pluralists who saw local decisions as the outcome of interest-group
politics. Pp. 14-15 (discussing, for example, ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND
POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961)).
11. Pp. 16-20 (discussing PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (198 1)).
12. Pp. 20-22 (discussing CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME POLITICS: GOVERNING ATLANTA,
1964-1988 (1989)).
13. P. 22 (noting that their discussion of urban theory "is not intended to suggest that law is
the primary, let alone the only, external structure influencing city decision making").
14. Pp. 22-23 ("As long as the rules of local government law evade serious analysis, they are
unlikely to be changed.... Reformation of the state legal structure must therefore be the primary
means by which city power is enhanced.").
April 2010]
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infrastructure, and other practical barriers flowing from state-created legal
structures that make it difficult for the Bostons and San Franciscos of the
country to compete with London and Beijing (to say nothing of New York).
Frug and Barron apply a similar analysis to several other city futures.
Thus, a "tourist city"-a haven for visitors, with Las Vegas as perhaps the
prime example--can be fostered by the local government's (albeit controver-
sial) ability to promote privatized public space but might be hampered by state
control over regional facilities like sports arenas and convention centers. A
"middle class" city that focused on income diversity, preserving broad eco-
nomic opportunity, and providing good public schools as well as other quality
city services may not have the power to achieve the right mix of these goals.
And any city that wants to embrace a regional future-an agenda that Frug
and Barron favor-must confront a structure of state law that pits local gov-
ernments against each other in a fragmented scramble for limited resources
and power.
As they note, Frug and Barron's four futures do not exhaust the possible
paths cities might choose, inviting speculation about how their frame might
apply to other urban destinies. Consider, for example, an increasingly im-
portant potential path for urban development toward what some
commentators have labeled the sustainable city. 5 This urban future would
emphasize density and transit orientation in development, promote walkability
and a mix of uses to reduce car dependency, encourage renewable energy and
urban agriculture, and foster other ways of making cities more livable while
reducing the carbon footprint of the built environment. Some cities are already
moving in this direction, experimenting with a broad range of policies, in-
cluding land-use regulatory changes, subsidies, alternative economic-
development strategies, creative financing mechanisms, and others.
6
Do cities have the power to embrace this future as robustly as many
advocates argue they must? One can almost instantly hear Frug and Barron
replying that the answer is yes and no-that there are likely many poorly
conceived and often misunderstood state-created legal structures that might
alternatively incentivize cities to pursue this path or deter them from doing
so. The great value of Frug and Barron's approach is that it provides such a
useful vocabulary for understanding the baseline of empowerment and dis-
empowerment that undergirds any substantive agenda that policymakers,
advocates, and community members might seek. 7
15. See, e.g., KENT E. PORTNEY, TAKING SUSTAINABLE CITIES SERIOUSLY (2003); see also
DOUGLAS FARR, SUSTAINABLE URBANISM (2008).
16. See Neal Peirce, Sustainable Cities, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 17, 2006, available at http:II
www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleld=l 2322.
17. It would be interesting to apply Frug and Barron's analysis retrospectively, to try to
isolate how varying legal structures shaped the choices that cities sought to make in response to past
junctures. Although the cities they describe vary in many important ways, in certain respects there is
a kind of uniformity in governance structures at the metropolitan level. A retrospective analysis
might reveal the link between certain legal constraints and specific outcomes, or might help explain
why similar outcomes result from different specific constraints. The methodological challenges to
this kind of analysis would no doubt be formidable, but could bolster (or perhaps challenge) the
[Vol. 108:957
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To the extent there is any limitation to the framework that Frug and
Barron have laid out in City Bound it is that the "city structures" it de-
scribes and the resulting constraints Frug and Barron outline seem to exist
in one-way state-local relationships. In these relationships, states create
legal structures and cities essentially work within those structures. This
leads Frug and Barron to focus their advocacy toward reforms at the state
level, which is certainly appropriate. But do cities and other local govern-
ments always take the structures they are given at face value?
II. LOCAL-GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP
On one level, Frug and Barron's claims about the importance of recali-
brating home rule deploy conceptions of democratic accountability and
slightly less explicitly a kind of law of unintended consequences to focus on
the need for state-level reform. On another level, however, City Bound
throughout describes a kind of learned helplessness of local governance,
with these laboratories of experimentalism hobbled by their inability to set
their own agenda. Repeatedly, Frug and Barron describe local officials (pri-
marily in the Boston area) in psychological terms that suggest a kind of
state-law-induced timidity or collective flinch reaction. Local officials, Frug
and Barron write, lack "self-confidence" (p. 163); "have reason to doubt"
the extent of their power (p. 187); act to preserve their self-interest out of "a
feeling of not being in control" (p. 207); express "hesitancy" about collabo-
rating with neighboring jurisdictions; and experience "deep ... fear" over
loss of competitive advantage (p. 209). Putting city governments on the
couch in this striking way suggests to Frug and Barron something of a psy-
chological cure: restoring clarity (although not full autonomy) to the scope
of local governance will, they suggest, give officials the requisite sense of
self-mastery to chart their own urban future.
This is a very interesting way to think about the unintended conse-
quences of the ubiquitous state involvement in local power and it describes
a dynamic too often ignored in explorations of the legal structure of local
governance. It would be hard, moreover, to quibble with the depth of the
empirical work that Frug and Barron have done to bolster their claims
about the psychology of local helplessness. Because their study focuses on
a handful of particular cities, with characteristics that might not be gener-
alizable, it is hard to know how widespread the ingrained timidity they
theoretical move that Frug and Barron make in linking the current structure of the state law of local
government to urban futures.
18. As Frug and Barron argue, for example, in discussing how to reform the current structure
of local parochialism, a "better alternative" to conditional state aid, would be "to promote regional-
ism by responding seriously to the widespread sentiment that the state has unduly limited home
rule." P. 211. Thus, the problem is perhaps less a question of the actual limits of city power than a
psychological barrier to local action.
April 2010]
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describe actually is.'9 There is evidence, however, that some local officials
take a decidedly less passive approach to the legal constraints they face.
To begin, many local governments-at times alone although often in
concert with other localities-actively work at the state level to change state
law.2' Almost every state has an organization representing local govern-
ments-various leagues and associations of cities -and some states have
2multiple coalitions, representing different types of local governments.
These coalitions pool local-government resources and political capital to
focus on a range of state-level legal issues, often mounting explicit lobbying
and grass-roots political campaigns.23 These efforts not only highlight the
shared interests that local governments have in mutual empowerment, but
also bolster the political strength that any given city or other local govern-
ment might have in isolation.24
Frug and Barron have elsewhere noted an international analogue to this
kind of coalition building.25 They have described international networks of
cities, such as United Cities and Local Governments, Sister Cities Interna-
tional, the International City/County Management Association, and other
19. One can speculate that large, relatively successful central cities that are the focus of
state-wide attention might be more constrained than jurisdictions more at the margins of such atten-
tion. Conversely, such cities might have more political power to navigate the shoals that Frug and
Barron describe.
20. Local governments, moreover, litigate both affirmatively and defensively to assert and
protect the scope of their authority, but this discussion will focus on other ways in which local gov-
emments seek to change or overcome the baseline of authority they have.
21. For a list of the forty-nine state municipal leagues, see National League of Cities,
State Municipal Leagues, http://www.nlc.org/inside-nlc/membership/state-municipal-leagues~v2/
SMLlinks.aspx (last visited Aug. 7, 2009). The National League of Cities is an umbrella organiza-
tion representing these state municipal leagues, and it maintains a full-time lobbying effort at the
federal level.
22. Nearly all states have state-level county associations, for example. See National Associa-
tion of Countries, State Associations, http://www.naco.org/Template.cfm?Section=Affiliates and_
Partnerships&Template=/cffiles/naco/stateassoc.cfm (last visited Aug. 7, 2009). This is not to men-
tion the array of associations that represent other actors associated with local governments,
including administrators, officials, police, fire, and other service providers.
23. See, e.g., Governor Called Urgent Meetings with City Officials to Discuss Impact of
Borrowing, Crry ADvoc. WKLy. (Sacramento, Cal.), May 15, 2009, at 4 (describing the Save Your
City campaign by the League of California Cities to respond to the local-government aspects of
California's budget crisis). Some coalitions of local governments have mounted public-relations
campaigns to promote the value of local governance, with an eye toward influencing the state-level
political discourse. For example, an effort spearheaded by the Colorado Municipal League, called
"Cities and Towns Make it Possible," includes billboards, newspaper ads, essay contests, videos, and
other messaging. See http://www.cml.org/info/cities/cities.aspx (last visited Aug. 7, 2009). Simi-
larly, the Florida Municipal League formed a coalition called "Building Citizenship in the
Community: Back to Basics" to help increase civic awareness and participation, as well as to target
specific legislative goals, particularly education. See Casey Cook, Civics Education: Small Effort,
Big Reward, THE DATAGRAM (Tallahassee, Fla.), May 15, 2009.
24. For some sense of the scale of this kind of activity, in one state alone, Minnesota local
governments spent $35 million to lobby the legislature from 2003 to 2008. See Tom Scheck, Local
Governments Spending More on Lobbyists, (Minn. Pub. Radio broadcast Apr. 20, 2009) (transcript
available at http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/04117/lobbyists-capitolV).




26international city networks. These organizations collaborate on a global
scale to build capacity, exchange knowledge, and influence the formulation
21of policies at the international level that impact local governments.
A second strategy that local governments employ to transcend the terms
of the legal authority they are given is seeking partnerships that can extend
or alter that authority. Perhaps the most significant alternative source to
which local governments have turned-and are increasingly turning-is the
federal government. In many of the areas of substantive authority that Frug
and Barron highlight, including revenue, land use, housing, education, and
others, federal-local collaboration provides a source of financing, a means
of obtaining legal authority independent from the states (indeed, in some
instances, as a shield against the states), and other resources for local gov-
ernment.2s As with state efforts to work with local governments, there is a
constant risk in the federal-local relationship that collaboration becomes
coercion. But local governments have the capacity to engage in this kind of
partnership willingly and for their own reasons.
29Frug and Barron are skeptical of the privatization of local governance,
and there are certainly many strong reasons to be cautious about ceding too
much public authority. However, in many instances public-private partner-
ships involving local governments can represent a conscious choice on the
part of those governments to leverage private resources, rather than merely a
capitulation to local lack of capacity. Indeed, to the extent that cities have
been successful in imposing everything from open-space to affordable-
housing requirements on private developers, there may be real potential to
harness private resources for the public interest rather than inevitably the
other way around.3 °
Third, in the face of ambiguous grants of power-and sometimes even
in response to direct preemption-local governments take other legal tools
they have been given and use them in creative new ways. Take, for example,
the crisis hitting so many cities arising from both predatory lending and
more recently from subprime mortgages and widespread foreclosures.3' As
years of equity stripping, fraudulent practices, and, more recently, the col-
lapse of mortgage markets have devastated already fragile neighborhoods
across the country, local officials have struggled to respond. An early wave
of reaction involved attempts to regulate lenders directly to hold them
26. Id. at 24-25.
27. Id.
28. See Davidson, supra note 8, at 971-75 (describing federal-local collaboration on a vari-
ety of policy issues).
29. See, e.g., pp. 175-77 (describing Disney World as an extreme example of the privatiza-
tion of public authority and public space).
30. Cf Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1285, 1314-29 (2003) (discussing the process of "publicization" through which private entities
come to act in ways that reflect public-law norms).
31. See Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y Yazback, City Governments and Predatory Lending,
34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 757 (2007).
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responsible for the consequences of lending practices that caused so much
harm to the urban fabric. Lenders responded with litigation that raised state
and federal preemption and this litigation significantly disrupted direct ef-
forts to regulate at the local level.33
In response, local governments did not simply take the scope of their au-
thority as given, but rather turned to an array of other legal tools to combat
the problem. Some cities, for example, invoked public nuisance, building on
the experience that localities have had using such theories against gang ac-
tivities.1 A few have even begun to explore civil-rights causes of action to
combat the harms of "reverse redlining," which is the targeting of minority
neighborhoods for unfavorable loan terms.33 These efforts, in turn, have
36faced serious challenges, and some have failed. Nonetheless, local gov-
ernments continue to seek ways of solving problems that will not wait on
clarifying uncertain home rule or changing the scope of state and federal
preemption.
These myriad examples-which are by no means exhaustive-suggest a
landscape of what I will call "authority entrepreneurship." Each is an in-
stance of local governments responding to constraining legal structures by
actively working against or around those structures. Whether in lobbying
and coalition building at the state (and federal) level, finding alternative
32. Id. at 770-72 (discussing local predatory lending laws).
33. Id. at 772-82; cf. David J. Barron, Foreword: Blue State Federalism at the Crossroads, 3
HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 1 (2009) (discussing action by the federal Comptroller of the Currency to
block local-government action on predatory lending).
34. Several cities have used public-nuisance injunctions to stem gang activities. See, e.g.,
People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997); Chicago v. Powell, 735 N.E.2d 119 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000).
35. Ngai Pindell, The Fair Housing Act at Forty: Predatory Lending and the City as Plaintiff,
18 J. AFF. Hous. & CoMM. DEv. L. 169, 176-78 (2009).
36. Cleveland's public-nuisance suit against twenty-one financial institutions arising out of
the subprime mortgage and foreclosure crisis was dismissed at the District Court level, in part on the
grounds of state preemption, see Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513,
517-20 (N.D. Ohio 2009), but the city is pursuing an appeal. See Andrew Longstreth, Judge Dis-
misses Cleveland's Suit Against Subprime Lenders, AM. LAW., May 18, 2009, available at
http:llwww.law.com/jsp/talldigestTAL.jsp?id=1202430792417.
37. Examples of similar creativity-with similar mixed results-can be found in a number of
other policy areas. Cities lacking the authority to respond adequately to gun violence sued gun
manufacturers. David Kairys, The Cities Take the Initiative: Public Nuisance Lawsuits against
Handgun Manufacturers, in GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (Bernard E. Harcourt ed.,
2003). Cities unable to regulate carbon emissions directly have created a variety of locally driven
structures to tackle climate change. See John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democ-
racy Through Land Law Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (2006). In the face of deadlock on
immigration policy at the federal level, local governments (often quite controversially) have begun
to use land-use authority, local police, and other tools to make their communities more or less hospi-
table to immigrants. See Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration
Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008). And a city told it could not foster income diversity
through inclusionary zoning because of a state rent-control ordinance that had nothing to do with
affordable housing, see Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 40-43 (Co-
lo. 2000) (Mullarkey, J., dissenting), preserved its program by taking advantage of a provision in
state law that exempted property in which the housing authority or similar agency had an interest.
Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, Comment, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully Creating Afford-
able Housing, 36 U.S.E L. REv. 971, 1017 (2002).
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sources of authority and resources, or transforming traditional tools to re-
spond to new tasks, cities and other local governments refuse to take the
constraints of their legal authority as the final word on their ability to re-
spond to the problems they face. Instead, local officials take on an
essentially entrepreneurial role-seeking new opportunities and disrupting
existing legal-structural equilibria created by state (and at times federal) law.
There is an extensive literature on public entrepreneurship that high-
lights the conditions under which political and legal actors innovate within
existing structures and may be capable of disrupting those structures in a
way that mirrors Schumpeter's creative destruction in economic markets."
To the extent that this literature has engaged with local governance, it has
tended to do so through a Tieboutian lens conceptualizing local govern-
ments as quasi-economic actors competing for mobile resources. 9 The
Tieboutian vision of cities as market actors has well-rehearsed limitations,
n°
but it may be possible to separate the distributional and other negative con-
sequences of aggressive localism from the potential benefits of a kind of
creative approach to problem solving.
While there seems promise in the capacity that some local governments
have found to confront challenges with creativity, it is certainly worth being
cautious about a power dynamic that may favor local governments with
greater resources, conversely disenfranchising localities with relatively less
capacity for this kind of struggle. It may also be that efforts by local gov-
ernments to transcend the bounds of their authority merely replicate the
worst kind of what Frug and Barron call "defensive localism,' 4 only over a
wider scale. These questions-and many others raised by local dynamic
reactions to state constraints-are beyond the scope of this Review, but are
worth exploring going forward.
To claim that local-government entrepreneurship plays a role within the
realm of legal authority is not to argue with Frug and Barron's central claim.
It would be hard to deny that states (and the federal government) largely
define "the extent to which cities can and cannot deal with the critical prob-
lems they face" (p. 231), and the need for local governments to struggle in
this way only reinforces the basic dilemma that Frug and Barron illuminate.
Moreover, local governments seeking creative solutions to the myriad
38. See, e.g., Adam D. Sheingate, Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and
American Political Development, 17 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 185, 187-91 (2003) (surveying the litera-
ture); see also David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 283, 290-
91 (2008) (discussing Schumpeter and theories of entrepreneurship).
39. See, e.g., Mark Schneider & Paul Teske, Toward a Theory of the Political Entrepreneur:
Evidence from Local Government, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 737, 742-44 (1992) (modeling and testing
the role of entrepreneurship in Tieboutian game-theoretical terms); see also Christian Iaione, Local
Public Entrepreneurship and Local Self-Government-The Rule of Law and the Role of the Judici-
ary: The Aftermath of Global Competition among Local Governments? (working paper, on file with
author), available at http://ssm.comlabstract=977321.
40. See, e.g., Aaron J. Saiger, Local Government Without Tiebout, 41 URB. LAW. 93, 102-15
(2009) (discussing the distributional consequences of Tieboutian sorting).
41. Pp. 207-09; see David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Defensive Localism: A View of the
Field From the Field, 21 J.L. & POL. 261 (2006).
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problems they face would no doubt rather have clear authority than have to
work around state-imposed constraints. And, regardless of the success of
any entrepreneurial activity, such efforts may be doomed to remain on the
margins.42
Nonetheless, these examples of local governments attempting to over-
come the constraints they face do suggest that Frug and Barron's picture of
the learned helplessness of local governance may be incomplete. And to the
extent that some commentators have suggested that formal legal structure is
less outcome determinative than what local governments actually do within
that structure,43 understanding the capacity that some local governments
have, at least some of the time, to transcend the constraints they face may be
nearly as important as understanding the constraints themselves.
The other primary reason to focus on local authority entrepreneurship is
that City Bound is in many ways a call to arms for reform. This, in turn, raises
the question of the political and practical viability of Frug and Barron's pre-
scriptive vision of a reformulated home rule. Frug and Barron are not merely
interested in changing our conception of local authority-they want to change
the way cities and metropolitan regions actually operate. Some of their pro-
posals seem promising, such as a more self-conscious balancing of local,
regional, and state interests and a kind of conditional grant of state authority
to local governments that collaborate on a regional basis. Conversely, some of
their proposals, while wonderfully creative and thought provoking, seem po-
litically unlikely, particularly their proposal for a regional legislature drawing
on the governance structure of the European Union, something they acknowl-
edge has never been tried in the United States.
Given the inherent challenges of convincing states to foster regionalism,
promote middle-class cities, or any other substantive vision that Frug and
Barron discuss (and others beyond), local entrepreneurship and a structure
of local collaboration that does not rely on traditional state supervision
might have more immediate promise. There are a number of practical me-
chanisms for fostering this kind of approach. As noted, for example, the
federal government has been at times a facilitator of interlocal collaboration
and this is an ideal role for the federal government to play. In the current
policy environment, a number of creative models are being proposed to fos-
ter enhanced capacity at the local level by the federal government, with
some reflecting Frug and Barron's admonition that incentives for collabora-
tion should empower local governments not undermine them.44
42. Cf Jan Schnellenbach, Public entrepreneurship and the economics of reform, 3 J. INST-
TUTIONAL ECON. 2, 183 (2007) (arguing that institutional checks and balances in democracies make
entrepreneurial strategies to affect fundamental change unlikely to succeed).
43. See, e.g., JESSE J. RICHARDSON, JR. ET AL., Is HOME RULE THE ANSWER? CLARIFYING
THE INFLUENCE OF DILLON'S RULE ON GROWTH MANAGEMENT (Brookings Instit. Ctr. on Urban
and Metro. Policy 2003), available at http://www.brookings.edul-/medialFiles/rc/reportsl2003/
01 metropolitanpolicyjesse j richardson jr/dillonsrule.pdf.
44. See, e.g., PENN INST. FOR URBAN RESEARCH, RETOOLING HUD FOR A CATALYTIC FED-
ERAL GOVERNMENT: A REPORT TO SECRETARY SHAUN DONOVAN 126-27 (2009), available at
http://www.upenn.edu/penniur/pdf/Retooling HUD-EntireReport.pdf (proposing a "Reverse Chal-
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One advantage that a federal facilitating role may have is that the federal
government is under no obligation to work with local governments through
state-created mechanisms only.4 This will be an increasingly important fact
as the scale of regionalism-of metropolitan governance-expands to en-
compass what Robert Lang and Dawn Dhavale have described as
11 46megapolitan" regions . Lang and Dhavale have identified a series of in-
creasingly visible regional clusters of continuous and interrelated
development, forming vast urban networks linked by common infrastructure
and cultural identity.47 These regions almost all cross state lines-indeed,
several encompass multiple states-and likely will be the locus of the over-
whelming majority of new development in the next several decades.
As transmetropolitan regions come to play an increasingly important
role as the appropriate scale for governance around a number of pressing
concerns, states may have a difficult time performing their traditional role in
policing the scope of local authority. As these new regions coalesce and
grow, they will increasingly look to the federal government as the only part-
ner capable of leveraging resources and coordination at the appropriate
scale.48
This is not the only path toward reform and, as Frug and Barron note,
state law will remain pervasive. Frug and Barron, although not focused on
many specific proposals in this volume (other than the idea of a regional
legislature (pp. 216-25)), accordingly target state-level legal reform. This is
understandable and, for fundamental, systemic change to occur, the only
game in town, so to speak. But given the political economy of local-
government law, if the terms and scope of legal authority is itself the poten-
tial subject of local-government agency, we should not ignore the ability of
local governments to take an active role in shaping their own legal destiny or
at least mitigating the more egregious constraints they face.
lenge Grant Program" that would incentivize collaboration at the state and local level across func-
tional policy areas to create programs with significant regional impact).
45. See Davidson, supra note 8, at 1019.
46. See ROBERT E. LANG & DAWN DHAVALE, BEYOND MEGALOPOLIS: EXPLORING AMER-
ICA'S NEW "MEGAPOLITAN" GEOGRAPHY (Metro. Inst. at Va. Tech. 2005), available at
www.mi.vt.edu/uploads/MegaCensusReport.pdf. The report identified ten "megapolitan" areas:
Cascadia in the Pacific Northwest, NorCal and Southland in California and Nevada, the Valley of the
Sun in Arizona, the 1-35 corridor running north from central Texas, the Gulf Coast, the Peninsula in
Florida, the Piedmont, the Midwest, and the Northeast. Id. at 13. The analysis by the Metropolitan
Institute at Virginia Tech continues to develop and is projecting additional emerging megapolitan (or
"New Metropolis") regions. See, e.g., Robert Lang & Paul K. Knox, The New Metropolis: Rethink-
ing Megalopolis, 43 REGIONAL STUD. 789, 796 (2009) (discussing twenty emerging megapolitan
regions). Other commentators have expanded on the idea of megapolitan scale as well. See, e.g.,
METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, BROOKINGS INST., MOUNTAIN MEGAS: AMERICA'S NEWEST METROPOLI-
TAN PLACES AND A FEDERAL PARTNERSHIP TO HELP THEM PROSPER (2008), available at http://
www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/0720_intermountain-west_sarzynski/IMW full_
report.pdf (discussing emerging megapolitan regions in the Intermountain West).
47. LANG & DHAVALE, supra note 46.





City Bound is an invaluable addition to our understanding of the nature
of local governance, painting a nuanced picture of the nature of city power.
This Review has sought to build on Frug and Barron's analysis to highlight
tools that local governments have used to challenge and at times transcend
their legal structures. Local governments, alone and in coalition, work to
change the laws that define their authority; they form creative partnerships
to work around legal constraints and find new sources of authority; and they
draw on traditional powers to solve novel problems. In all of these instances,
for better or worse, successfully and unsuccessfully, local governments take
something of a leap, refusing to accept the bounds of their authority as a
given.
If local governments can be entrepreneurial about the authority they
have, the dynamic raises a host of questions. Descriptively, what are the
conditions and circumstances that seem to lead some local governments to
acquiescence and lead others to creativity and innovation?49 Normatively, is
this kind of creativity and collaboration attractive or should advocates focus
more on the deeper structures that local governments face? Should local
authority entrepreneurship be channeled in more transparent or democrati-
cally accountable ways? Are there distributional consequences to a mode of
governance that might be as unevenly distributed as economic, social, and
political capital undeniably are at the local level?
These questions will have to await further scholarship, but it is a sign of
the strength of Frug and Barron's work that they provide a useful way to
begin to approach such issues-and many others. City Bound is elegant,
passionate, and clear. Frug and Barron's analysis of the actual structure of
the legal authority granted and denied to local governments and the conse-
quences of the incentives that the uneven landscape of home rule creates
should be required reading for anyone interested in the future of urban
America.
49. Cf Sheingate, supra note 38, at 191 (discussing the conditions that might foster public
entrepreneurship, including opportunities, resources, and assets).
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